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 Generally speaking, more is written about the Left than the Right. On the one 
hand, the Right is not particularly cerebral (in one of the rare unequivocal statements he 
made, John Stuart Mill called the Tories the ‘stupid party’) or politically ambitious. The 
politics of ‘easy as she goes’ is unlikely to yield much in the way of profound cogitation. 
By contrast, the history of all Left parties is that of internal political struggles over the 
right organizational strategy and tactics, the right analyses of political situations, 
domestically and internationally, and the right policies to adopt and advocate in pursuit 
of goals that aspire and threaten to change society quite radically, even when they pursue 
reforms and not revolutions. So, the self-generated literature of the Left is, unsurprisingly, 
far more voluminous than that of the Right. On the other hand, the established ruling 
classes typically scrutinize the Left, like all else they find troublesome, inconvenient and 
threatening, quite closely. So to the literature of debate and self-analysis is added that of 
inquisition.    
 It is a sign of the decline of the Western Left over the decades of neoliberalism that 
its self-reflection and self-examination, as well as the scrutiny of the mainstream, have 
ebbed. Little has been written about its trajectory since the 1970s. Even a relatively full 
account, if it were to be written, would discover major changes: inter alia, the advent of a 
Marxism without Marx (Freeman 2010), the elimination of the notion of ‘economic’ 
contradiction and the rise of a ‘political Marxism.’ Equally important is the undoing of 
the close relation of national and class politics. At one time they were discussed in the 
same breath in terms of a wider geopolitical economy of the capitalist world. As equally 
material precipitates of the operation of capitalism, nation and class were viewed in a 
single frame by Marx and Engels in their analyses of the political events of their time, by 
137
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 12 (1) Spring 2017 
the classical theorists of imperialism and by the Bolsheviks making sense of their 
revolution in the idea of uneven and combined development, and by postwar Marxists 
seeking to understand Third World revolutions (Desai 2013).  
 However, more or less in tandem with the rise of neoliberalism, this close bond 
has been broken. The nation-state and its economic role have been erased from the realm 
of legitimate Marxist or left scholarship which now focuses narrowly on class politics, 
confining the nation to an exclusively cultural existence (Anderson (1983) can be said to 
be the definitive text of this move) and handing it over to often anti-Marxist postmodern 
and postcolonial writing. One of its earliest works to strike out in this direction was 
Robert Brenner’s 1977 engagement with dependency and world system theorists.1  
 The results have been paradoxical. The Western Left has gone from being 
internationalist to being cosmopolitan (to deploy Gramsci’s very acute distinction), i.e. 
from attempting to understand the national as well as class divisions created by capitalism 
in order to overcome them, to assuming that the former are irrelevant in a single and 
unified world economy. This erasure of the ‘materiality of nations’ has created an 
‘economic cosmopolitanism’ which has taken two forms. There has been the discourse of 
US hegemony and empire, originally rooted on the Left in World Systems analysis which, 
as I show (Desai 2013), was in its turn derived from writers such as Charles Kindleberger 
who were sublimating the desires of the US ruling classes for a unified world economy 
under their control into a scholarly ‘theory’ where it appeared as accomplished fact. In it 
only one nation mattered and guaranteed the unity of the world economy. And, in the 
1990s there was the discourse of ‘globalization.’ Also originating in US ruling class 
impulses at a time when, notwithstanding the triumphalism of the end of the Cold War, 
the US economy was quite weak, it was designed to disown responsibility for the health of 
the national economy so that US corporations could pursue their interests all over the 
world all the more effectively (I explore the reasons for this in Desai 2015 and 2016). In 
‘globalization’ no nation mattered economically and market forces alone unified the 
world economy.  
 In the discourse of the Western Left in the neoliberal decades, nations either do 
not matter or are undesirable even as the objective nationalism and imperialism of 
western countries and the ‘machinery of world political economy’ (Nairn 1977) they 
operate (but only partially control) managed to impose not just low growth but actual 
economic retrogression on so many Third World countries around the world. Just when 
the international contradictions were becoming more acute and consequential than ever 
before, the Left was busy denying them. The hapless inhabitants of the Third World were 
to give up the narrow nationalisms that had hitherto allowed them to achieve some 
modicum of development and join ‘global’ movements against capitalism alongside far 
more prosperous Western workers as if their interests were unproblematically aligned. 
                                                 
1 Desai, forthcoming, assesses its effects on Western Marxism’s relation with the Third World. 
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Left Nationalism as a version of Economic Cosmopolitanism 
 
 However, ignoring elephants in rooms never made them disappear. Even the 
cosmopolitan pretensions of the neoliberal Western Left take national forms. Paul 
Kellogg’s Escape from the Staple Trap: Canadian Political Economy after Left Nationalism 
(hereinafter EST) takes aim at Canada’s own version of this deformation, Left 
Nationalism, the theoretical paradigm that has dominated Canadian Political Economy 
(CPE) since the 1970s. Emerging in tandem with the rise of world systems and 
dependency theory and, one might add, in a mirror image of theories of US hegemony 
which began to appear at the same time, Left Nationalism has claimed that Canada is 
‘weak’ and ‘lives in the shadow of its much richer, much more powerful and much more 
developed southern neighbour’ and as such is a ‘dependency,’ part of the ‘semi-periphery’ 
and even a ‘neo-colony’ (Kellogg 2015, 6). The effect has not only been to vastly 
exaggerate the power of the US in the work of major representatives of CPE but, equally 
importantly, to blunt the critique of Canada’s domestic and foreign policies. If Canada is 
constrained by its semi-colonial status, the real critique must surely be aimed at the real 
imperialist, the US.  
 In taking on Left Nationalism clearly, thoroughly and credibly as he has, Paul 
Kellogg has done CPE yeoman service. EST aims to ‘establish Canada’s place in the world 
system’ (xvii) and show that it is ‘an imperialist nation, not an oppressed one – a member 
of the core economies of the world system, not on the semi-periphery’ (Kellogg 2015, 8).  
In this review, I highlight what I take to be the signal moments in Kellogg’s critique. Since 
I am convinced by so much of it, my review will be not be enlivened by direct critique 
except on a couple of occasions. Rather, I propose to point to the many avenues which 
EST, like all really substantial and lasting works, opens up for further research and 
analysis. The avenues I pick will naturally reflect my own preoccupations as a critic of 
economic cosmopolitanisms, of US hegemony, globalization or earlier versions and a 
votary of historical understanding more generally. 
 Kellogg opens with his bewilderment, as a young scholar, at the hot new account 
of Canada’s ‘dependent’ status which contrasted so starkly to its actual prosperity and to 
its internal colonialism over its aboriginal peoples. He traces the development of Left 
Nationalism through three moments: the classic moment of the ‘Waffle’ of the 1960s and 
1970s, the opposition to the Canada-US Free Trade deal in the late 1980s and 1990s and 
the more general opposition to globalization, a moment which clearly reveals to me the 
preference of leading Canadian CPE writers for the older cosmopolitanism of US 
‘hegemony’  over the new fangled one, ‘globalization’ (Kellogg 2015, 7). 
 The substance of Kellogg’s critique proceeds through a succession of hard-hitting 
chapters, brimming over with useful graphs and charts on various widely-used metrics of 
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Canada’s economy and social structures in relation to other major economies, and many 
inventive new ones (Kellogg has a knack for measuring the hitherto unmeasured) such as 
the relative weight of the top 100 and the top 500 corporations in national economies 
(Kellogg 2015, 51-52).Through these he argues that Canada is not only rich and highly 
productive but also, notwithstanding the shadow cast by an economy ten times its size 
next door, an autonomous national economy with its own ‘very Canadian bourgeoisie,’ a 
thesis which, post-Harper, should go down more easily than it might have done before.   
 One might imagine that the folly of ‘using the criteria useful for understanding the 
dynamics of the global South and transpose them to Canada’ would be obvious to 
everyone. Well, it clearly was not to generations of Left Nationalists and Kellogg’s 
meticulous demonstration, narratively and statistically, of this folly in a key chapter is an 
important reminder of how scholars can wander, and have wandered, off course in 
droves. This chapter is critical because the all-pervasiveness of the Left Nationalist case 
means that it likely lurks in the less examined parts of all our brains.  
 So powerful is Kellogg’s case against Left Nationalism that he inadvertently reveals 
a limitation of his own. When ideas that are so obviously wrong (as Kellogg proves) 
become so powerful (in this case powerful enough to be shared across most of the 
political spectrum, as he also shows), the reader is left wondering why they did so. Kellogg 
does not ask the question and treats what is an ideology as a mere error, a politically 
necessary error as any old error. While giving this question the full treatment it deserves 
would have lengthened the book too much, it should at least have been posed, and its 
corollaries noted – among them, whose interests does it serve? When did it become 
necessary? When and how did it emerge (for necessity does not always suffice its own 
fulfillment)? Ideology, in other words is no mere error.   
 Kellogg’s chief accomplishment is that he forces us, to adapt the title of Richard 
Rosecrance’s 1976 work on the US, to think about ‘Canada as an ordinary [first-world] 
country.’ It may seem surprising or paradoxical that while America as an Ordinary 
Country was written to announce the end of the US’s (inevitably temporary and radically 
partial) dominance in the postwar world, to wit the US’s weakness, Kellogg’s work 
announces Canada’s strength. Such a sense of paradox can be easily dispelled: the thesis 
of Canadian weakness is simply the reflection in the Canadian mirror of that of US 
strength, ‘hegemony’ and ‘empire.’ Both are equally ideological.   
 
Multinationals in and from Canada  
 
 Kellogg refutes the Left Nationalism argument by providing evidence against its 
chief claims: that Canada is home to very few multinationals, that it is dominated by 
foreign capital and that that it is a raw materials exporter. Against these theses, Kellogg 
marshals veritable armies of data. He argues, firstly that Canada is home to more top 100 
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and top 500 corporations relative to its population than most core countries and secondly 
that foreign and US control may have risen until the end of the 1960s but have been 
broadly falling since them. While these statistics are arresting enough, the qualitative 
stories they tell are even more noteworthy and would have strengthened Kellogg’s case, 
giving it historical bottom in addition to its impressively broad statistical one. Let me 
explain. 
 To take the matter of the number of large corporations in Canada, not only has 
the Canadian economy become home to some pretty big corporations for its size in 
recent decades, as Kellogg documents, they have emerged disproportionately in the 
western mining sector and, as they sought political influence, they brought us the 
disastrous Harper decade. Kellogg’s work opens up the path towards a fuller account of 
the development of the ‘very Canadian bourgeoisie’ which would stretch back further into 
history and locate the sectoral (agriculture, manufacturing, resources) and geographical 
(east to west, which then ‘wanted in’) centre of gravity of the Canadian economy as it 
shifted and document how it altered the character and motivations of Canada’s ruling 
classes, the policies and policy-paradigms they supported and the successive articulations 
these shifts produced of the Canadian to the world economy.  
 The second point about foreign ownership in the Canadian economy is also not 
just factually wrong, as Kellogg amply shows. The whole question of foreign ownership 
and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) is vexed with more misunderstandings than 
Kellogg has space to indicate. While Kellogg does note how, while it may be harmful in 
the Third World context, foreign ownership is not necessarily so in First World ones, the 
larger story reinforces his point in ways that deserve exploration in new works.  
 In the field of international political economy (IPE) and CPE, both dominated by 
economic cosmopolitanisms, the role of MNCs is, in the first place, highly exaggerated 
(see Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009 for a thorough critique). Statements such as 
‘Today 50 of the largest 100 economies in the world are run by multinationals, not by 
countries. Mitsubishi is bigger than Saudi Arabia, General Motors is larger than either 
Greece, Norway or South Africa’ (Ellwood, 2001, p. 55) abound and need to be corrected 
by the more scrupulous folks such as those at UNCTAD who point out that these are 
based on comparing MNCs sales to countries’ GDP when the proper comparator to GDP 
would be value added, not sales. When value added is taken as the comparator instead, 
there were no corporations in the top 50 (UNCTAD 2002) and their presence lower down 
the scale is as much a sign of the presence of a large number of small and even tiny 
countries as it is of the size of corporations.  
 Moreover, few accounts of the role of MNCs in the world economy note that 
through most of the post war period until very recently MNCs were not only 
overwhelmingly based in the first world and in the US, contrary to the ‘jobs going south’ 
and ‘corporations search for low wages’ story, they tended, in fact, to invest 
overwhelmingly in other First World countries chiefly because their real need was for 
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markets, which are not large in low wage countries. This patters of FDI flows among first 
world countries reflected neither the integration of western economies nor US 
domination of them. It was set off in the postwar period thanks to other western 
economies protecting themselves against exports from a war-swollen US economy and 
insisting that if US corporations wished to sell goods in their markets, they would have to 
produce those goods there. Thus, faced with barriers to exporting goods, US corporations 
exported capital and became MNCs. Rather than seeing them as instruments of US 
power, many saw them as sapping it (Gilpin 1975).  
 Canada had its own version of such protectionism against US exports: the Auto-
pact. While Kellogg (2015) is absolutely right in emphasizing how the Left Nationalist 
case rested on factoring it out of their analyses, he terms the resulting pattern of 
investment flows an ‘integration’ of western economies (101). However, whether that is 
what it was, rather than the playing out of antagonisms between western nations and the 
assertion of Western European nations and Canada against US power at its height, 
forcing the US to export capital, is a question that deserves further investigation. If such 
an investigation decides in favour of the latter alternative, it will bolster Kellogg’s case 
against Left Nationalism on the matter of foreign ownership while also questioning 
cosmopolitan paradigms like US hegemony and globalization and re-introducing the 
issue of inter-imperialist antagonism.    
 
What Staple Trap? 
 
 Finally, there is the matter of Canada’s primary commodity exports, its ‘staple 
trap.’ Kellogg rightly points out that primary commodities in Canada are produced in 
agriculture and mining sectors which are vastly different from any real ‘dependency’ or 
‘semi-colony.’ Like in any First World country, agriculture and mining production is 
capital intensive, not labour intensive. What matters, Kellogg points out, is not the 
production and export of primary commodities per se, or Canada’s reliance on their 
export, but the organic composition of the capital which is high in capital intensive and 
low in labour intensive production.   
 However, the historical role of primary commodity production and export from 
white-settler colonies such as Canada in the world economy would have bolstered 
Kellogg’s case even more. The capital intensive production of primary commodities in 
these countries and the US was a world changing development. Beginning in the late 19th 
century, it depressed world prices of these goods for the peasant populations of the non-
settler colonies. In the postwar period, the subsidies which such production received not 
only kept international prices depressed but also provided the material basis of the food 
aid that destroyed entire agricultural sectors in the Third World. Moreover, the 
investments that made primary production in the white settler colonies so capital 
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intensive, and those that increased the total factor productivity by investing in the 
infrastructure such as roads, railways and electricity, without which these primary goods 
could not have reached the world market from these remote territories, was made 
possible because Britain extracted vast surpluses from her non-settler colonies, 
preeminently India and the Caribbean, and invested these funds in her white settler 
colonies (De Cecco 1984). This drain of surplus contributed to their near stagnation 
under colonialism and deepening poverty while bringing these primary producing 
economies to levels of prosperity equal to the world’s industrial and imperial economies.  
 Incidentally, it was this flow of funds from non-settler to settler colonies via 
London that formed the basis of the mis-named ‘gold standard.’ Gold played no role 
beyond providing a benchmark for the value of the pound sterling. It should have been 
called the colonial standard because it was the colonial surpluses that made it possible for 
Britain to export capital on the scale required to provision the world economy with 
liquidity (Desai 2013). In this sense, too, Canada was historically part of the core and not 
the periphery.    
 
The Home Market 
 
 Contrary to certain types of brash scholarly aggrandizement, new arguments 
typically rest on old and neglected ones. Indeed the real credit of a scrupulous scholar lies 
not in claiming originality on the basis of a cursory survey of the existing literature (the 
more cursory the more effective in this self-serving exercise), but in unearthing the 
currents of thought and opinion that had emerged and had to be suppressed before 
(ideological) error could prevail. EST performs another critical service by unearthing 
arguments about the development of Canada’s national economy on the basis of the 
construction of a national or home market first made by H. Claire Pentland. In doing so, 
Kellogg has demonstrated Canada’s normality as a capitalist nation with a home market 
which provides the basis of the formation and expansion of capitalism.  
 What Kellogg fails to note, however, is that while the plenitude of the home 
market permits the development of capitalism, its simultaneous inadequacy for both 
commodities and capital impels imperial expansion, with or without a formal territorial 
empire. Rosa Luxemburg was the first to note how the Russian legal Marxists’ critique of 
the Narodniks’ argument that Russia was incapable of developing capitalism for lack of a 
home market was surplus to requirements: they should have demonstrated only that a 
home market was formed, not that it sufficed, and would always suffice, the commodities 
produced and the capital accumulated. For that would be a version of the Say’s Law that 
Marx so vehemently criticized and which became the basis of anti-Marxist neoclassical 
economics and, for all Luxemburg’s efforts and notwithstanding its anti-Marxism, also of 
much of what today passes for ‘Marxist economics’ (Desai 2016). It is incapable of 
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explaining the dynamics of capitalism and the causes of its crises because it rules out gluts 
of capital and commodities and crises in general. For the same reason, it also cannot 
explain imperialism but, contrary to all Marx wrote and said, assumes a national, self-
sufficient, capitalism (I deal with these problems in my Desai 2010, 2013 and 2016). 
Canada’s normality as a first world capitalism consists of both its home market and its 
imperialism and working out of the political and geopolitical economy of the latter is 
another task which Kellogg’s work lays the ground for and invites.  
 
And finally, Imperial and National Economies 
 
 That is also why ideas about Canada’s ‘subcontracted sovereignty’ from Britain 
have to be contested. While Canada may have been a formatively loyalist construction, 
such loyalty did not preclude the assertion of local control that made the British North 
America Act necessary or the opposition to imperial preference, a system which would 
have stalled, if not reversed British relative decline. The real history of Canada and its 
capitalist class would probably find that it has ploughed its own furrow and often 
opportunistically played off the US and the UK against each other. 
 Indeed, a fuller critique of Left Nationalism would be not only to refute their 
claim that Canada is a semi-peripheral country but question the very basis of World 
Systems analysis from which it springs (as I do in Desai 2013) with the attendant 
assumption of a succession of hegemonies as the narrative spine of their history of 
capitalism (rather than a spread of productive capacity which progressively weakens 
imperial control) and that of the non-antagonistic integration of all ‘core’ economies, 
rather than erasing the inter-imperial antagonisms that gave rise of the Thirty Years’ 
Crisis (1914-45) of imperialism which consisted of two World Wars and a Great 
Depression. The rise of China and other emerging economies has swelled the ranks of 
productive and powerful economies too much to leave any credibility sticking to the idea 
of a succession of hegemonies. And emerging antagonisms between major centres of 
productive power – as represented by contemporary flashpoints in Ukraine, Syria and the 
South China Seas – are too many to support any notion of an easy integration of core 
economies.  
 In light of this, one may demur, finally, with a key conclusion Kellogg (2015) 
comes to: that for the Left ‘in an imperialist nation, it is impossible to combine ‘left’ with 
‘nationalist’ (8). Here, Kellogg’s analysis and critique of Canadian imperialism overshoots 
its target: the answer to Canadian imperialism is precisely its reduction to the status of a 
mere ‘nation,’ like all others, such that the left’s programme too, as Marx and Engels long 
ago pointed out, must in the first instance be national. All other roads lead to Left 
versions of imperialism. 
 
144




Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
 
Brenner, Robert. 1977. “The Origin of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-
Smithian Marxism.” New Left Review I/104 July-August, 25-92. 
 
De Cecco, Marcello. 1984. The International Gold Standard: Money and Empire. 2nd ed. 
London: Pinter. 
 
Desai, Radhika. 2010. Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis.  
Research in Political Economy. Volume 26, 2010, pp. 101-41. 
 
______. 2013. Geopolitical Economy: After US Hegemony, Globalization and Empire. 
London: Pluto.  
 
______. 2015. Look Back in Hope? Reassessing Regulation Theory. Kees Van der Pijl (ed) 
The International Political Economy of Production. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
 
______. 2016. The Value of History and the History of Value. Turan Subasat (ed) The 
Great Meltdown of 2008: Systemic, Conjunctural or Policy-created?, Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing 
 
Ellwood, Wayne. 2001. The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalization. London: New 
Internationalist.  
 
Freeman, Alan. 2010. Marxism Without Marx: A Note Towards a Critique. Capital & 
Class 34 (1) (February 1): 84–97. 
 
Gilpin, Robert. 1975. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political 
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Hirst, Paul Q, Grahame Thompson and Simon Bromley. 1996/2009. Globalization in 
Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
 
Nairn, Tom. 1977. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism. London: NLB.  
145
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 12 (1) Spring 2017 
 
UNCTAD. 2002. Are Transnatioonals bigger then Countries? Geneva: UNCTAD. 
146
